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The Case that Felled a City:
Examining the Politics of Indian
Public Interest Litigation through
One Case
Anuj Bhuwania
“The new role of the Supreme Court is that of a
policymaker, lawmaker, public educator and super
administrator all rolled in one. In the US, they
have the Congress, the Federal Environment
Protection Agency and bags of money to protect
the natural environment. Here, we have our
Supreme Court” (Divan 1995).
“In Delhi, in 2000, so much of the government’s
activity in so many matters boiled down to
securing compliance of Court orders in PIL that
one might have been excused for thinking of it as
the Court’s bailiff” (Verma 2002:88).
1 In 1984–85 a lawyer named MC Mehta filed a bunch of Public Interest Litigation (PIL)
cases in the Supreme Court  of  India.  These cases were fated to be landmarks in the
history of PIL in India and are generally discussed as the archetypical environmental PILs,
which  set  the  pace  of  judicial  intervention  in  urban  governance  and  environmental
regulation in India. In narrating the story of PIL, these cases are usually read as signaling
a new era, shifting the focus of PIL away from what had been its dominant concerns until
then—poverty and judicial reform—to the subject of the environment. These cases have
been trailblazers in exploring the boundless potentialities of PIL in India, particularly in
Delhi. My focus in this article, however, will be on the pioneering innovations introduced
in these PIL cases. I will foreground these fundamental procedural departures and the
politics immanent in them.
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2 PIL was primarily a revolution in judicial procedure, and while this fact is noted, it is
often glossed over in the study of its functioning. India’s PIL jurisdiction is generally
acknowledged to have a fair amount of procedural flexibility, but it is still studied as if a
PIL is  like any other case in terms of  its  materiality.  For instance,  in legal  academic
analyses  of  PIL,  attention  continues  to  be  focused  on  the  analysis  of  the completed
judgment  although  many  such  cases  never  actually  end  at  all,  but  comprise  an
agglomeration of orders or judgments issued over time. The emphasis on the dilution of
locus standi of the petitioner as the only major unconventional attribute of a PIL case
represses the other radical characteristics of such cases that in reality take it far beyond
any understanding of an adjudicative proceeding.  I  would argue here that traditional
modes of studying judicial behavior do not really suffice for PIL cases, some of which
never even culminate in final judgments.
3 Four of these MC Mehta PILs from 1984–85 are still in progress after three decades, with
no end in sight. The unending nature of these cases provides us with a hint as to their
unique nature. These four vintage, yet still thriving PILs are the cases popularly known as
the Taj Mahal Pollution case,1 the Ganga Pollution case,2 the Delhi Vehicular Pollution
case3 and  the  particular  case  that  I  will  be  focusing  on  here,  Writ  Petition  (Civil)
4677/1985. No such simple moniker would work for the latter case as its very cause of
action,  i.e.  its  central  dispute shifted,  not  once,  but  multiple  times in the last  three
decades. It started with a plea against stone-crushing units, then concerned itself with
pollution in the river Yamuna, then with the condition of the Ridge Forest and with
mining in the Aravalli mountain ranges, but its most famous targets were hazardous large
industries,  then  “non-confirming”  industries  and  finally  and  most  spectacularly  it
became known as the “sealing” case against commercial establishments in residential
areas.  The  story  of  this  PIL  case  can  be  narrated  as  the  story  of  Delhi’s  urban
transformation  in  the  last  three  decades  as  it  singlehandedly  led  to  large-scale
deindustrialization of the city. This PIL did perform this task assiduously and relentlessly.
But the question that is worth posing here is: why and how did PIL emerge as the primary
agent  of  this  transformation.  While  Delhi,  just  like  many  other  cities,  saw  massive
changes in its political economy during this period with a move from industry to services,
what marks Delhi’s dislocations as distinct is their source and their basis—they are based
not, as in the past, on administrative or municipal policy or executive directives, but on
judicial directives in a single PIL case concerning pollution in the city. The spectacular
efficacy of a PIL case in carrying out such a role, I would argue, can be explained not just
by the external ideological trends prevailing at the time, but also by the peculiar nature
of PIL itself. While WP 4677/1985 became a means of spectacular urban transformation, it
also  broke  fresh  ground  for  PIL  itself  as  a  perennially  unstable  and  fundamentally
malleable jurisdiction. The shifts that these cases brought about in PIL affected not only
its political economy, but also the very nature of its process. This is the story I shall try to
narrate here.
4 WP 4677/1985 has been dealt with by most of the leading charismatic PIL judges of the
last three decades from Justice Bhagwati to Justice Kuldip Singh and Justice Sabharwal,
making it particularly fertile as a case study for the history of PIL. While the focus of this
article will be on this one case, I will begin with a brief discussion of another of the still
surviving MC Mehta cases of 1985, the vehicular pollution case, in so far as it resonates
with the particular case at hand. While the MC Mehta cases were first admitted by Justice
Bhagwati in 1985, these cases scaled new heights in the early 1990s with Justice Kuldip
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Singh at the helm, enabling him to establish a reputation as a “green judge.” The style of
functioning of his Court at this time can be discerned from the following description
provided in 1995 by Shyam Divan, then a young environmental lawyer: 
A public interest litigation to clean up the Ganga has caught the judge’s fancy. Each
Friday a huge shoal of advocates, administrators, company executives, and public
officials  attentively  follow  the  Court  proceedings  as  a  range  of  snappy  judicial
directions are issued… The Ganga Court functions a bit  like a village panchayat
dispensing  justice  in  the  shade  of  a  banyan  tree.  The  rigor  of  formal  Court
procedures and statutory requirements are diluted in favor of a summary, result-
oriented process (Divan 1995:1557).
To characterize so peculiar an attempt to mimic “traditional justice” in the hallowed
portals of India’s Supreme Court with its liveried attendants in turbans and full Raj-style
regalia,  perhaps a more appropriate analogy would be the medieval  Court  or durbar
rather than a village panchayat. Justice Hidayatullah had anticipated this and as early as
1984, he thought it fit to compare PIL with Moghul Emperor Jehangir’s “Zanjir-e-Adl—a
gold chain which he had hung from his apartment to the ground. Supplicants used to give
a tug to ring a bell in his private apartment and the emperor would before a jharoka
(window) and hear and decide the complaint in person” (Hidayatullah 1984:2). Such judicial
conduct as Divan observed above showed PIL as a jurisdiction where the highest Court of
a common law judiciary was self-consciously trying to enact the Weberian ideal type of
kadijustiz: “the administration of justice which is oriented not at fixed rules of a formally
rational law but at the ethical, religious, political, or otherwise expediential postulates of
a  substantively  rational  law”  (Rheinstein  1954:213).4 While  J.  Kuldip  Singh’s  judicial
conduct set new standards for PIL judges, it was not fated to be exceptional for too long,
as we shall see.
 
The Delhi Vehicular Pollution case
5 Writ Petition (Civil) 13029/1985, better known as the Delhi vehicular pollution case, was
to lead to a complete overhaul of public and private transport in the city. Its impact
started to be felt with a series of orders in the mid-1990s. Its initial orders included the
phasing-out of leaded gasoline, the introduction of pre-mixed fuels for two-stroke engine
vehicles and the removal of 15-year-old commercial vehicles. But soon-to-come in this
case  was  the most  famous of  its  decisions—to order  all  commercial  public  transport
vehicles to change from diesel or petrol to Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), which was seen
as a “green” fuel. The decisions were actually taken at the behest of a fact-finding body
called  the  Environment  Pollution (Prevention and Control)  Authority,  abbreviated as
EPCA and commonly referred to as the Bhure Lal Committee after its chairman, who was
then a  member  of  the  Central  Vigilance  Commission.  The  EPCA was  appointed  as  a
statutory body on January 28,  1998 under the orders of  the Court.  This five-member
committee was initially composed of a representative from the Central Pollution Control
Board, the Automobile Manufacturers Association of India, the Centre for Science and
Environment (an environmental NGO) and the Transport Department of Delhi, in addition
to the Chairman.5 Because the committee was designed to speak to the interests and
expertise of the major affected parties, since 1998, the Supreme Court has consistently
looked to the committee as its fact-finding commission and has relied almost exclusively
on its findings when making its decisions in this Case (Rosencranz and Jackson 2003:15).
Of  course  the  Court  has  not  always  followed  EPCA  recommendations—the  most
The Case that Felled a City: Examining the Politics of Indian Public Interest...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 17 | 2018
3
prominent example of such an instance being the fate of diesel-fueled private vehicles. As
a 2004 article on this case notes,
The  Environment  Pollution  (Prevention  and  Control)  Authority  (EPCA)
recommended  that  private  diesel  cars  should  not  be  registered  and  that  the
Supreme  Court  should  freeze  sales  of  diesel  cars.  Lawyers  for  the  automobile
industry strenuously opposed this. Instead of following the EPCA recommendation,
the Court ordered only that all private cars must conform to engine standards by
new, tighter deadlines (Bell et al. 2004:39; see also Mathur 2003).
Another glaring instance of the Court’s skewed sense of priorities in this case was when it
did follow EPCA recommendations and directed (on the same day as the CNG order) to
augment the number of public transport buses in Delhi up to 10,000 by April 1, 2001.6 But
the Court did not make any significant effort to implement this order (while its other
orders were wreaking havoc) and even in 2015, Delhi has much less than 10,000 public
buses in its fleet.
6 The petitioner MC Mehta was active in the Delhi vehicular pollution case up until 1995.
Thereafter the Court relied on Harish Salve, a senior lawyer who was appointed as the
amicus curiae—literally “friend of the Court,” a Court-designated position that became
increasingly common in PIL cases around this period. The crucial role that the amicus
played here has been described thus: “In this case, the amicus curiae was a combination
of special master and advisor to the justices” (Bell et al. 2004:39). He collected and sorted
out factual material and distilled from the numerous affidavits and other representations
submitted to the Court a précis of their perspectives. At several critical junctures, Salve
did factual research to debunk what he described as “extravagant claims” and otherwise
played  a  central  role  in  moving  the  case  forward  (Bell et al.  2004:39).  For  a  case  of
citywide scope, a relatively small number of stakeholders actually played much of a part
in the deliberations.
7 On July 28, 1998, the Supreme Court issued its order that all public transport in Delhi
would be converted to run on CNG by April 1, 2001.7 The CNG order included buses, taxis
and auto-rickshaws,  some 100,000 vehicles  in all  (Trust  N.d.:12).  This  was immensely
controversial because the science behind it was severely contested, with two committees
giving diametrically opposite reports regarding the advisability of adopting diesel or CNG
(Sharan 2005; Rosencranz and Jackson 2003:223). Even if the problem of pollution in Delhi
was widely acknowledged to be severe, many alternative solutions to this dismal situation
had  been  suggested.  The  most  controversial  aspect  of  the  Court’s  solution  was  that
private vehicles were relatively unaffected, while public transport was made to bear the
brunt—directly  affecting the livelihoods of  people  employed in public  transport.  The
effect of this forced change of fuel on bus personnel and commuters was drastic. There
was a sudden drop in the number of public buses available.
8 The  drivers  of  auto-rickshaws  (officially  known  as  TSRs:  “Three-wheeled  scooter
rickshaws”)  were particularly  badly hit.  The changeover from petrol  to  CNG engines
required a relatively large monetary investment, which most auto-rickshaw drivers were
not in position to make, and bank loans were hardly available to them. They ended up
taking usurious loans from private financiers. Besides, CNG was not actually available in
sufficient quantity for many years, even after it had been imposed as the only fuel for
auto-rickshaws. This led to extreme hardship, as auto-rickshaw drivers would normally
have to queue for 3–4 hours to refuel their vehicles, which affected their workdays very
adversely. Serpentine queues of dozens of auto-rickshaws outside gas stations were to
become a normal sight in Delhi in the first few years of the 21st century.
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9 The auto-rickshaw drivers’ situation was actually exacerbated by an earlier order of the
Supreme Court in this same case in 1997, which stated that:
It would be in the interest of the environment, to freeze the number of TSRs for the
present at the level at which they are actually in use in the city. We, therefore,
direct that there would be no grant of fresh permits in respect of the TSR, save and
except by way of replacement of an existing working TSR with a new one.8
The  result  of  this  Court-ordered  permit-freeze  was  catastrophic  for  auto-rickshaw
drivers.  In 2010,  the EPCA found that,  according to the Transport Department of the
Government of Delhi, the number of registered three-wheelers in the city was 55,236,
while 72,429 of them had existed in 1997 (EPCA 2010). There was thus a substantial decline
in absolute numbers of auto-rickshaws in Delhi between 1997 and 2010. Simultaneously,
by 2010, as the EPCA observed, the city was registering over 1,000 new private vehicles
every  day.  Thus,  in  the  period  from  1997  to  2011,  while  private  vehicles  increased
exponentially, the Supreme Court’s freeze on TSRs resulted in an artificial scarcity of
permits.
10 The decline in the number of auto-rickshaws in Delhi’s streets was due to the combined
effect  of  the  Supreme Court’s  TSR-freeze  order  of  1997  and its  enforcement  of  CNG
conversion soon after. In 2002, the Court did allow a minuscule 5,000 new permits to be
issued, but otherwise the number of TSRs remained stagnant until 2011, when the Court
finally allowed 45,000 new permits after the TSR unions approached it in August 2009,
and appealed for relief from the freeze “in view of the increase in population and increase
in the number of vehicles during the past several years.” The Court asked the EPCA to
examine the matter afresh and requested it “to give a report as regards the needfulness
for fresh permissions for three wheelers.”9
11 The situation that then prevailed was explained in a 2010 report on auto-rickshaws in
Delhi:
The permit cap created a gap between the supply of autos and the growing demand
from Delhi’s increasing population. A black market for auto permits soon emerged
and the price of an auto permit rose dramatically. Just a year later owner-drivers
were ordered to replace their autos or convert them to CNG by fitting expensive
conversion kits. Unable to afford the Rs. 25–30,000 CNG kits, thousands of owner
drivers had no option but to sell their autos and permits to financiers at bargain
prices, further focusing power in the hands of the consolidating finance “mafia”
(Trust N.d.:2).
The black market price of an auto-rickshaw with permit increased to 6.5 lakh rupees by
2011, while the cost of the auto-rickshaw itself was only 1.4 lakhs—a difference of more
than 5 lakhs (Harding 2011). In November 2011 when the Supreme Court finally allowed
45,000 new auto-rickshaw licenses to be granted, the market price immediately crashed
and went down to as low as 2.5 lakh rupees.10 The creation of this black market in TSRs
was purely a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, as can be gauged from the results of
its revocation. Already, the order about change in fuel had made many auto-rickshaw
owners take loans from private financiers, and when they were unable to pay these back,
they had to transfer their permits to these financiers. Studies have shown that before the
Supreme Court’s  double  whammy,  most  auto-rickshaws  were  owned  by  drivers
themselves, while the effect of the fuel change and the permit freeze was that almost the
entire fleet of auto-rickshaws came under the control of financiers,  and drivers were
converted into wage labor.11 Even the EPCA recognized in 2010 that “the bulk of the
vehicles on road are owned by a limited number of people who rent these to drivers on a
charge of around Rs 250–300 for an 8-hour shift.” By the time the EPCA recommended
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Nyaya Bhoomi v. Transport Department (2011), the removal of the cap on auto-rickshaws,
recognizing  their  importance  as  public  transportation  and  finally  understanding  the
impact of the Court-ordered freeze, great harm had been done to all concerned. As its
2010 report noted:
EPCA has noted that the current crisis of pollution in the city and its adjoining
areas is  largely because of the exponential  growth of private vehicles.  The only
option for the city in the future is to provide a viable and reliable public transport
system, which will  restrain the use of  private vehicles on the roads.  The three-
wheeler  plays  an  important  role  in  providing  an  intermediate  public  transport
facility. It remains cheaper to operate as compared to any four-wheeled vehicle and
removal of the cap and the high transaction costs associated with it will bring down
the cost of capital drastically and provide space for improvement of the service on
road.  Removal  of  cap  will  also  help  in  eliminating  the  dominating  hold  of
“financier’s mafia” who are exploiting not only the drivers but also general public
by pushing up artificially the capital cost of 3-wheelers and hence the operational
cost (EPCA 2010).
Both these decisions—the permit freeze and the CNG changeover—in the Delhi Pollution
case  were  taken  without  even  giving  the  city’s  auto-rickshaw  drivers  and  their
representatives a chance to argue their side of the story. I was witness in August 2009 to
the proceedings of this case. An application had been filed in the Supreme Court for its
permission to increase the number, which had been set in 2002, of permits for auto-
rickshaws. The lawyer for the auto-rickshaw union had just begun his oral submission
pleading for notice to be issued in this case, because seven years had passed since the
freeze,  and  the  rationale  for  the  original  order  of  1997—that  auto-rickshaws  were
polluting vehicles—was now irrelevant since the CNG fuel now used was eco-friendly. If
notice had been issued, the application would in any case have been examined by the
EPCA, and based on their recommendation, the Court would have considered granting
permission. But the amicus curiae Harish Salve weighed in, opposing the application itself.
His  contention was that  the presence of  auto-rickshaws on Delhi  roads led to traffic
congestion,  because  of  which  motor  vehicles  generally  had  to  spend  more  time  in
stationary mode with engines on, leading to further pollution, therefore even CNG-fuelled
auto-rickshaws would cause pollution. Presumably, in Salve’s reasoning the introduction
of thousands of motor vehicles in the city on a daily basis would cause no such problem.
No authorities were cited by Salve and this was an extempore objection by him.
12 In  this  case  which  transformed  Delhi’s  roads,  the  Supreme  Court  displayed  a  stark
preference for imposing disproportionate environmental costs on public transport while
allowing private transport to thrive, even though the latter was the cause of most of the
vehicular pollution in Delhi. The case induced a marked increase in private transport,
which had expanded so exponentially since the Court’s actions of the late 1990s that the
reduction in carbon emissions of public transport vehicle was over the period more than
compensated for by the rise of private vehicles, particularly diesel vehicles.
13 An ideological interpretation of this case can rightly be made, as it significantly worsened
the livelihood of thousands of poor informal-sector transport workers in the name of
environmental problems and the need for clean fuel, while stimulating the demand and
supply  of  private  automobiles,  just  when  this  sector  was  opening  up  in  a  post-
liberalization Indian economy. While such an interpretation would not be incorrect, I
would instead ask a different question: why was the Court the instrument of such a major
policy change? And how was this forced transition carried out?
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14 The Supreme Court acted supposedly on purely environmental grounds, marshalling the
spectra  of  vehicular  pollution  without  adequately  considering  the  impact  its
interventions would have on vulnerable sections of the population who live a hand-to-
mouth  existence,  and  without  making  any  effort  to  cushion  them  from  the  harsh
economic  effects  of  such  a  transition.  There  was  a  callousness  at  work  in  which  a
blinkered and absolutist idea of environmentalism—Amita Baviskar called it “bourgeois
environmentalism”  (Baviskar 2002)—was  imposed,  where  the  poor  are  bizarrely  and
conveniently seen as responsible for urban pollution, and have to bear disproportionately
the costs of moving to a more ecologically benign system. While Baviskar’s diagnosis of
such a trend is persuasive and spot on, it is worth reflecting on why PIL emerged as the
most  powerful  weapon for  this  “bourgeois  environmentalism” phenomenon.  While  a
class-based ideologically inflected worldview among appellate judges is hardly new and
indeed is part and parcel of any realist understanding of judicial behavior, PIL empowers
judges  to  take their  predilections much further  than ordinary adjudication.  It  is  the
ability  to  enact  and materialize  a  particular  worldview that  makes  PIL  so  especially
effective. I would argue that PIL was uniquely suited to impose such a worldview, not just
because  many  judges  shared  it,  but  also  because  the  extreme  malleability  of  PIL
empowered them to carry it out. In fact, the repeated exclusion of adversely affected
parties  from  even  getting  a  hearing  that  we  see  throughout  the  history  of  these
“environmental” PIL cases is symptomatic of the fact that the class-based exclusions of
“bourgeois  environmentalism”  gets  materially  inscribed  within  the  adjudicatory
processes of PIL.
15 Soon after this imposed fuel change, there was an appreciable drop in vehicular pollution
in  Delhi.  The  effects  seemed  to  last  for  about  a  decade,  after  which  the  problem
resurfaced, as the number of private vehicles had increased so much in the meantime
that  their  combined  emissions  neutralized  the  reduced  pollution  caused  by  public
transport. But the interesting thing about this case is not the ideological aspect as much
as the Supreme Court’s capacity to ride roughshod over the interests of tens of thousands
of  people  employed  in  “non-corporate  capital”  (Chatterjee  2013:208–35),  with  the
unspoken assumption that they could be made redundant and their concerns ignored.
This kind of blinkered obliviousness is simply not conceivable by any democratic regime
in India. The only time the Indian state could carry out such a draconian measure was
perhaps during the Emergency regime. And therein you have the unique power of the
Court, which as many critics have argued,12 plays a very careful negotiating role when it
comes to high politics, but as we have seen here, can take an intransigent stand when it
comes to vulnerable groups. It is not irrelevant that many of these decisions were made
during the period of 1998–2004, when Jagmohan, the principal architect of the Emergency
era “cleaning up” of Delhi as the then Vice-Chairman of the Delhi Development Authority,
held office in the NDA government at the Centre, as we will see in the next section.
16 WP(C) 13029/1985 continues to thrive with the same amicus curiae Mr. Harish Salve, who
has  held  this  position in  this  PIL  for  2  decades  now.  This  means,  he  is  much more
conversant with this case than any judge who hears it, because typically a Supreme Court
judge officiates in such a case for 2–3 years at most. In the other unending mammoth PIL
popularly known as “the forest case,” in which Salve has served as amicus for a similar
period, I have had a chance to witness him address and brief a new incumbent judge
joining  “the  Forest  Bench,”  so  that  the  latter would  also  be  acquainted  with  the
background and “glorious” history of the case.13 The story of many landmark PIL cases is
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often  written,  with  good  reason,  in  terms  of  the  judges  heading  the  bench  and  is
identified with their charisma, Justice Kuldip Singh being a good example. But perhaps
the time has come to narrate the history of some other more recent PILs in terms of the
charismatic amicus curiae involved in them, as they play a no less crucial role in steering
the case in new directions. During its hearings in 2014–15, the veteran amicus in WP(C)
13029/85 was assisting the Court in supervising the construction of two big road projects
—the Western and Peripheral Expressway, which would reroute vehicular traffic away
from Delhi and thus reduce traffic and pollution in the city.
 
WP(C) 4677/1985: The many-headed hydra
17 One of the other still active PIL cases (Writ Petition (Civil) Number 4677) filed by MC
Mehta  in  1985  changed  the  face  of  Delhi  more  than  any  other  case.  It  is  generally
regarded as a case concerning industrial  pollution in Delhi  as  it  famously led to the
removal of industries from the city, in the name of implementing city-zoning laws,14 but
this was just one of the many achievements of this PIL. The Master Plan of Delhi would
get so much attention as a result of this case that it became a paperback bestseller during
the mid-2000s. But WP(C) 4677/1985 initially started with a plea against stone-crushing
units, which were alleged to be causing dust pollution in the city. 300 such units were
closed down under Court orders in 1992 (Frontline 2000). Already, in a sign of things to
come,  after  discussing the chaos in implementing these closure orders,  leading legal
commentators observed, “one may wonder whether the Supreme Court of India can have
the time and resources for the above sort of micro-management” (Divan and Rosencranz
2002:259). No lessons were learnt from this experience however. Such chaos was repeated
cyclically multiple times in the future avatars of this case and in ever-increasing scale, as
we shall see. The PIL case did not come to a close with the achievement of the objective
with which it was first filed. The continuation of the case, after the decree to close down
the stone crushing units was passed, was not merely to monitor the implementation of its
judgment, but to take up fresh causes of action. The closure of the units, in retrospect,
was merely an unmarked blip in the juggernaut that this case became.
18 The petitioner MC Mehta thereafter filed a number of interlocutory applications (IAs) in
this same case, relating to other aspects of pollution in Delhi. The initial ones related to
pollution in the river Yamuna and led to the setting up of sewage treatment plants and
common effluent treatment plants (Frontline 2002). Another big area of intervention in
this case was the ridge forest of Delhi, which the Court wanted to protect in its “pristine
glory.”  On  May  9,  1996  the  Court  directed  that  the  ridge  be  made  free  of  all
“encroachers,” as per the terms of the Delhi Master Plan. This would impact over 30,000
residents living in three colonies adjacent to the Asola Wildlife Sanctuary. The affected
residents were nomadic tribals, who used to work in the erstwhile Bhatti mines of this
area. As Ravi Agarwal notes, “under direction from the Supreme Court they were asked to
relocate, even though many adjoining private farmhouses were left untouched” (Agarwal
 2010).  Some  of  the  tribal  residents  managed  to  resist  eviction  through  political
negotiations, but their fate remains precarious.
19 Another  application,  IA  No. 29,  relating  to  mining  operations  near  Badkal  Lake  and
Surajkund tourist resorts in the state of Haryana near Delhi, was filed as part of this PIL
by the petitioner. The Court barred any mining activity within two kilometers of these
resorts by an order dated May 10, 1996 (see Ahuja 1997:807). A spin-off of these IAs was
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the Court’s intervention in curtailing mining in the Aravalli hills, a matter that this case
continues to grapple with even after nearly two decades. The nature of the orders passed
in this PIL under each of these headings was such that, even after the Court definitively
pronounced  on  any  of  these  issues,  the  implications  of  each  were  so  broad  and
implementation so complicated with so many affected parties who were often not even
represented, that each of them took years of the Supreme Court’s time and some are still
ongoing. As the case became larger and larger, the numbering of the numerous IAs filed
by various parties in the various branches of this case became more and more unwieldy.
As early as November 11, 2002, the order sheet of a hearing in this case lists an item it was
dealing with as IA No. 1782/2001,  in IA No. 1172,  in IA No. 22,  in Writ Petition (Civil)
No. 4677/1985.15 This one writ petition had so many heads, that it really was like a many-
headed hydra. Conventional modes of legal analysis would struggle to make sense of a
juridical beast such as this writ.
20 With Justice Kuldip Singh at the helm in the 1990s, this case almost single-handedly led to
the deindustrialization of Delhi (before Justice YK Sabharwal led it in a slightly different
direction beginning in 2005). The first significant step in this direction culminated on July
8, 1996 with the Court ordering the relocation of 168 large industries outside of Delhi
within five months. The Court reasoned:
Delhi  is  recording  heavy  population  growth  since  1951.  As  the  city  grows,  its
problems  of  land,  housing,  transportation  and  management  of  essential
infrastructure like water supply and sewage have become more acute. Delhi is one
of the most polluted cities in the world. The quality of ambient air is so hazardous
that lung and respiratory diseases are on the increase. The city has become a vast
and  unmanageable  conglomeration  of  commercial,  industrial,  unauthorised
colonies, resettlement colonies and unplanned housing. There is total lack of open
spaces and green areas. Once beautiful city, Delhi now presents a chaotic picture.
The  only  way  to  relieve  the  capital  city  from  the  huge  additional  burden  and
pressures, is to deconcentrate the population, industries and economic activities in
the city and relocate the same in various priority towns in the NCR.16
The Court’s  order was as per the “Second Master Plan for Delhi  – Perspective 2001”
(henceforth, the Master Plan) notified in 1990 which specifically provided that hazardous
/ noxious / heavy / large industries were not permitted to operate within the city of
Delhi and the existing industrial units falling within these categories were to be shifted /
relocated outside city limits.  These industries  were either  characterized in the Delhi
Master  Plan’s  Annexure  III  as  “H(a)  category”  meaning  “Hazardous  and  noxious
industries” or “H(b) category” meaning “heavy and large industries.”
21 The Court ordered that if the factory owners chose to relocate to a neighboring district,
they would have to pay each worker monthly wages during the period of the move, as
well as one year’s salary as a resettlement bonus. If owners opted to close their factories,
workers would be entitled to six years’ wages as a retrenchment allowance. Two years
later, it was found that only one out of the 168 industries had paid any compensation to
the workers (Dasgupta 1998). In any case, the liability of the factory management was
limited to the narrowest possible definition of “workmen,” those who were on the rolls as
permanent employees (Baviskar, Sinha, and Philip 2006:199). An estimated 35,000–50,000
workers were rendered jobless because of this Court-enforced relocation, but were not
even heard by the Court until after the closure of the factories (DJAM 1997:22).17 A new
federation  of  trade  unions  and  other  human  rights  organizations  was  formed  in
December 1996 as a response to the Supreme Court’s orders, called Delhi Janwadi Adhikar
The Case that Felled a City: Examining the Politics of Indian Public Interest...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 17 | 2018
9
Manch (DJAM—Delhi Socialist Rights Forum, [Nigam 2001]). The Manch tried to intervene
in Court, as Amita Baviskar records, 
three  trade  unions  affiliated  with  the  Manch  approached  the  bench  separately
through their  lawyers,  asking to  be  heard in  the air  pollution case.  The judges
brushed  them  aside,  merely  remarking  that  the  Court  would  protect  workers’
interests and did not need the intercession of the unions. This verbal assurance was
not recorded as a part of Court proceedings (Baviskar et. al 2006:199).18 
Later again, 
when the Manch approached the Supreme Court and pointed out that the judges’
orders were being violated, the Court suggested that they take their complaints to
the  labor  commissioner,  an  official  whose  previous  inaction  had  already
demonstrated  his  total  lack  of  interest  in  protecting  workers’  rights  (Bhuwania
2014:200).
The closure suited many of the industries. The bigger ones were in any case keen to shut
down or relocate, but Indian labor laws made the closure of an industrial establishment
almost impossible. The Court’s intervention gave them a timely opportunity. Not only
that, this order provided them a real bonanza as they were free to dispose of at least 32
percent of the industrial land as commercial real estate—land that had been earlier given
to them by the government at heavily subsidized rates. The Court was not unaware of this
as it noted, “In view of the huge increase of prices of land in Delhi the reuse of the vacant
land is bound to bring a lot of money which can meet the cost of relocation.”19 On the
other hand, it was estimated that the total number of people directly affected by loss of
employment (workers and their families) as a result of these orders exceeded 2,500,000
(Baviskar et al. 2006:200).
22 Within three months of the July 1996 order, the Court also ordered in the same case the
relocation  or  closure  of  another  513  factories,  46  hot  mix  plants,  21  arc/induction
furnaces and 243 brick kilns, all of which were to be closed down or moved by 1997. This
spate of 1996–97 orders was only the first of many major developments in this case that
completely reorganized the city. Already, even at that early stage, it was perceived as
signaling a new trend. As Baviskar noted,
The partnership of environmentalists MC Mehta and Kuldip Singh, advocate and
judge,  which  resulted  in  directives  that  affected  the  lives  and  livelihoods  of
hundreds  of  thousands  of  workers  and  their  families,  people  who  had  no
representation in Court, exemplifies the new efficient dispensation of justice in the
“public interest” that middle-class people acclaim (Baviskar et al. 2006:211).
The case continued, though the dramatis personae changed. By the late 1990s, an amicus
curiae was appointed in this case—senior advocate Ranjit  Kumar—as was the general
trend  in  PIL  cases.  The  public  interest  petitioner  MC  Mehta  now  participated  only
intermittently,  if  at  all,  and henceforth Kumar was to  play  a  key role  in  the  future
directions that the case took.
23 In 2000 came the next major development in the de-industrializing trajectory of this case.
This  time,  the  scale  was  even  bigger  as  the  order  was  to  close/relocate  all  “non-
conforming” industrial units, i.e. factories located in areas designated as “residential” in
the Delhi Master Plan, the attempt being to strictly enforce Delhi’s zoning laws.20 The
stage was set in 1996 itself, when the Court asked the Delhi Pollution Control Committee
(DPCC) for information on the number of polluting and non-polluting units running in
non-conforming  areas.  The  resulting  survey  put  the  figure  of  industries  in  Delhi  at
126,218 units, with 97,411 of them being non-conforming (Ahmed 2000). It was decided
that only “household industries”—those that did not pollute, employed fewer than five
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workers, used no more than one kilowatt of power, and occupied an area smaller than 30
square meters—would be licensed and allowed to carry on where they were. But only 5
percent of the 51,000 units that applied for these licenses could meet these stringent
criteria (Frontline 2000). On April 1, 1996 the Court ordered the rest to be relocated by
January 1, 1997. However a fundamental problem arose. There was nowhere to relocate
them to, as there were not enough industrial plots as envisaged in the Master Plan. Only
after the order was passed in 1996, a government developer called Delhi State Industrial
Development Corporation (DSIDC) began to acquire land in Bawana,  on the Northern
outskirts of the city,  where small  factories from residential  areas could relocate.  The
Court  meanwhile  allowed  those  factory  owners  who  had  applied  to  the  DSIDC  for
alternate plots, temporary licenses to continue operating in their old locations. The Court
asked the government to submit quarterly reports about the progress in complying with
its orders. In September 1999, the Court heard the case again and fixed the deadline for
relocation for December 31, 1999. Eventually by July 2000, 52,000 factories had applied for
alternate plot allotments, but not a single factory had been relocated. Because it had still
not finished developing the industrial land, in 2000, DSIDC asked the Supreme Court for
an extension until  March 2004 in order  to develop the Bawana industrial  properties
(Baviskar 2002:202).
24 At this point, the Court lost all patience with the relocation process and on September 12,
2000,  it  ordered  that  “all  polluting  industries  of  whatever  category  operating  in
residential  areas  must  be  asked  to  shut  down.”  This  judicial  exasperation  with  the
mendacity and inefficiency of the government would lead to massive devastation in the
lives of Delhi’s laboring class. As factory owners later complained, “They were bearing the
brunt of the punishment that ought to have been meted out to the state for its inaction”
(Gill 2009:214).
25 It  was as if  the Court had no duty to take care of workers’  interests in this massive
relocation exercise—that duty was the concern of the government alone. When, after the
December 31,  1999 deadline lapsed and the process was nowhere near complete,  the
Supreme Court issued notice to the government representatives in November 2000 that
they would be hauled up for contempt for not implementing the Court’s  orders,  the
government  panicked  and  “ordered  the  immediate closure  of  all  nonconforming
industrial  units  (and not  just  the  polluting  ones)” (Gill  2009:203).  Almost  a  hundred
thousand factories were thus closed down within a week. Government officials, escorted
by heavily armed policemen, went around sealing factory premises, locking their doors,
disconnecting  electricity  and  water  supply.  Riots  ensued,  with  a  general  strike  on
November 20, 2000. The accompanying violence led to three workers being shot dead by
the police and hundreds injured.21 The Court,  soon after these incidents,  scolded the
government for closing not just polluting, but also non-polluting units. However, its new
deadline for closing all  polluting units was not much later,  fixed for January 7,  2001,
eventually extended until December 31, 2002 (Gill 2009:203). In the intervening chaos of
the 2000–2003 period, thousands of factories closed down, though the Delhi government
tried and eventually succeeded in liberalizing the Master Plan norms for factories. The
definition of “household” factories was liberalized as well, as 24 areas with about 20,000
factories  and  a  land-use  concentration  of  70 %+  industrial usage  re-designated  as
“industrial,” and thus regularized. This issue led to a major political battle between the
central and the state governments, as Delhi’s land use planning is in the hands of the
central government.
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26 Kaveri Gill has analyzed the impact of this Supreme Court action on a specific “polluting
and non-conforming” urban informal  industry,  that  of  plastic  recycling,  which could
ironically  otherwise  be  seen  as  environment-friendly.  This  community  of  workers,
belonging to a Dalit caste called “Khatik” and working in the plastic scrap trade, had prior
to  this  case  been  quite  successful  in  exercising  their  political  voice  around  a  caste
identity.  But  the  interventions  of  the  PIL  Court  in this  case  negated their  ability  to
mobilize politically. The usual democratic channels were bypassed by the Supreme Court.
In Gill’s analysis,
the elected representatives of the people, in this case Outer Delhi MLAs and others,
such as former and present chief ministers from both political parties, were given
no avenue to contest the order and influence the course of policy on the basis of
larger trade-offs with poverty and livelihoods in their constituencies (Gill 2009:217).
The Court was thus able to ride roughshod over the negotiations of political society and
able to impose its vision of the city via its apotheosis of zoning laws as incorporated in
the Master Plan.
27 In September 2000 the Court had taken the implementation of the order out of the hands
of the Delhi Government, instead appointing “an independent nodal agency under the
auspices of the Central Government to ensure that the relocation took place within the
desired timeframe” (Gill 2009:209). The Central Minister for Urban Development was to
head  this  nodal  agency.  It  was  not  a  co-incidental  choice  of  appointee,  as  the  then
incumbent  was  none  other  than  Jagmohan,  the  man  responsible  for  the  massive
Emergency-era social engineering in Delhi. The Court showed its hand here, knowing full
well that “Delhi governments lacked the political will to carry out relocation orders, as it
would adversely affect the livelihood and business of hundreds of thousands of voters”
(Gill 2009:209) and that if there was one person in government who could implement
these  far-reaching orders,  it  was  Jagmohan.  And soon enough,  the  relocation orders
“came to be associated with Jagmohan’s office and person” and in the discourse of the
displaced,  with  the  Emergency-era  dislocations  (Gill  2009:209).  The  Court’s  actions
reminded the factory owners of the Emergency years, specifically, as Gill notes, because:
the Supreme Court refused to hear the lawyer representing the collective body of
small-scale  traders  and manufacturers  affected by the relocation order.  Various
locality- and community-based trade associations had spent a considerable amount
of  time and effort  raising substantial  sums of  money in  order  to  hire  a  lawyer
willing to defend them, only to have the Supreme Court have him sit down without
an adequate hearing (Gill 2009:213).
As with the auto-rickshaws, affected parties were not heard by the PIL Court, before their
fate was sealed. Jagmohan was eventually removed from the Urban Development Ministry
in 2001 at the behest of his own party leaders from Delhi, when he refused to ratify the
change in land-use norms to regularize de facto “industrial areas.” He was then made the
Tourism Minister, a position in which he wreaked further havoc, acting with unusual
alacrity in a Delhi High Court PIL to demolish Delhi’s largest slum complex in Yamuna
Pushta.
 
WP 4677/1985 becomes “the sealing case”
28 After having successfully deindustrialized the city through this single PIL, Writ Petition
(Civil)  4677/1985,  the Supreme Court  went further down the path of  making Delhi  a
“world-class city” with a judgment on February 16, 2006 in this same case proclaiming
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that all commercial units in residential areas would be closed down. This directive took
the zoning logic of the Delhi Master Plan further, with its clear separation of residential
and commercial establishments. This PIL 4677/1985, which until 2005 was officially called
“RE: Shifting of Industries from Residential Area of Delhi,  New Delhi” in its recorded
orders, took a new direction after March 17, 2005, when a bench headed by Justice YK
Sabharwal,  acting at the behest of amicus curiae Ranjit Kumar, decided “to hear and
decide the issue of commercialization of residential areas.”
29 This fateful move would make the case even more infamous than it already was—and both
this judge and this Amicus lawyer would be identified with this new chapter of this PIL.
The  Court’s  intervention  would  affect  hundreds  of  thousands  of  commercial
establishments in Delhi, as the desired zoning separation existed only on the map. The
contradictions between the Master Plan’s desired city and the city that in fact existed
were so numerous that many even surmised that the majority of shops in Delhi would
turn out to be in areas demarcated as non-commercial, and would therefore be guilty of
“misuse of property.” In fact, the judgment of February 16, 2006 records that the lawyer
for MCD had argued that, “since there is a large-scale misuse of residential premises for
commercial purposes, it is a physical impossibility to remove the misuser.” The Court
reacted with anger: “Such a contention is not open to MCD. It is not merely a case of only
lack  of  will  to  take  action,  it  appears  to  be  a  case  of  predominance  of  extraneous
considerations.” The state’s role in this process, in the eyes of the Court, was seen as
tolerating  these  illegalities  and  indeed  being  complicit  in  them,  partly  explained  as
“corruption” and partly as “vote bank politics,” but often narrated as a jumble of the two.
Or,  as  Justice  YK  Sabharwal  wrote  in  a  newspaper  article  about  this  case  after  his
retirement, “Judges decide on law and not on populism” (Sabharwal 2007).
30 The municipal authorities were therefore ordered to seal these commercial properties so
that they could no longer be (mis)used. The extreme mismatch between the de jure and
de facto situation here has often been explained away in terms of the modernist state’s
attempt  to  impose  western  zoning  ideas  alien  to  Indian  sensibilities  and  therefore
impractical. But it could, at least partially, also be attributed to the abject failure of the
state  authorities,  in  being  able  to  implement  their  own  Master  Plan.  There  were
projections with a timeframe in the Master Plan for a certain amount of commercial
space to be developed for expected populations by specific dates. The state, repeating its
record with the industrial estates, did not end up developing even half the commercial
space it was supposed to. The resulting mismatch of supply and demand of commercial
land led—not surprisingly—to shops opening in areas demarcated as “non-commercial.”
The  Delhi  Development  Authority  (DDA)  was  the  sole  developer,  having  acquired
agricultural land all over the city in the 1950s and 60s and being given the responsibility
to develop it. But the DDA completely failed to provide industrial, commercial or indeed
residential  properties  in  the  measure  estimated  by  its  own plan  document.  Without
holding the DDA and its failed monopoly accountable, the Court repeatedly penalized the
unplanned construction of industrial, commercial or residential establishments. It went
about treating the symptom rather than the cause.
31 Once again, the people who ran commercial establishments and worked in them were
going to be penalized in the name of clamping down on illegality, without being heard in
the process. The state’s fundamental failure in creating the demand for these illegalities
by not delivering the commercial space it targeted in the Master Plan, was impatiently
glossed over. While the Court ignored this omission, it relied on the same document as
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gospel  to  insist  on  strict  enforcement  of  zoning.  It  thus  was  wilfully  blind  to  the
impossibility of  what it  was demanding,  by harping on illegalities while ignoring the
underlying reason behind them. Because the Court had ordered the sealing of commercial
establishments in areas not designated as commercial, the case came to be known as “the
sealing case.” It was under that name that the Supreme Court dominated the newspaper
headlines in Delhi in 2006–07.
32 Once the Court had decided to start the crackdown on “misusers,” it asked the MCD about
the process it wanted to adopt to go about this mammoth operation. The MCD suggested a
four-part plan: it was to start first with a survey of misuse which would take six months,
followed by notices issued to the misusers identified; then an opportunity of being heard
would be granted and finally properties would be sealed, with a focus on the blatant and
obvious cases of large-scale misuse. But the Court had no patience for following such a
process. Instead, it wanted a public notice to be issued immediately (within ten days) in
major newspapers stating that violators would have 30 days to stop misuse on their own,
and file an affidavit saying they would themselves close shop and resume residential use.
After 30 days, if misuse did not stop, the MCD would start the process of sealing, starting
on major roads. This was the Court’s plan of action. What followed however was much
more  complicated,  as  for  once  the  Court  had taken on a  really  powerful  lobby—the
traders and shopkeepers of Delhi.22
33 Initially things seemed to be following the Court’s script.  The first  public notice was
issued on February 26, 2006, stating that the first phase of sealing would target those
roads with more than 50 percent commercial misuse as well as other major roads above a
specified width. On March 24, a little over a month after the Court’s initial sealing order
of February 16, some traders’ associations approached the Court for more time to stop
misuse, and the Court directed that the affidavits for voluntarily ceasing misuse would
have to be filed within the next four days, by March 28, following which they would be
given until June 30. But for those who did not file an affidavit, the sealing action would
commence on March 29, 2006. The March 28 deadline for affidavits was extended to April
7, but sealing operations had started by then. 40,800 affidavits were filed in this allotted
time, swearing to cease misuse by June 30 and “giving an undertaking to the effect that
violation of this would … subject him/her to offence of perjury and contempt of Court for
violation of  the order of  the Court” (The Hindu 2006).  But the large number of  shop
owners  who  filed  affidavits  was  still  only  a  fraction  of  the  total  commercial
establishments affected by the Court orders. For the others, the sealing action had begun,
a Court-led campaign cheered on by the drumbeat of the daily newspapers.
34 Not trusting the municipal bodies’ ability and willingness to carry out its orders without
constant  prodding,  on  March  24,  2006,  the  Supreme  Court  appointed  a  monitoring
committee,  “in  order  to  oversee  the  implementation  of  the  law,  namely  sealing  of
offending  premises  in  terms  of  the  letter  and  spirit  of  this  Court’s  directions.”  The
Committee was headed by Bhure Lal, the retired bureaucrat who also headed the EPCA,
which continued to give reports on vehicular pollution-related issues.  The other two
members of this Committee were KJ Rao, another retired bureaucrat and Major General
(Retired)  Som Jhingan.  They  were  allotted  office  space  in  Delhi’s  swanky  NGO-cum-
cultural hub, the India Habitat Centre. By this time, the petitioner advocate MC Mehta in
whose name the original case was still continuing, 21 years after he filed it, hardly ever
appeared in Court. Instead, the amicus curiae Ranjit Kumar had taken charge. The Court
had “directed that all the petitions relating to sealing in Delhi are to be routed through
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the learned Amicus  Curiae.”23 This  meant  that  any petition relating to  sealing of  any
commercial  establishment in Delhi  had to be dealt  with as part  of  this  case and not
independently. And the Amicus decided when and how it was heard by the Court. This was
of great significance, as soon there were thousands of interlocutory applications (IAs) and
Writ Petitions filed by owners of commercial establishments aggrieved by the sealing
actions taken pursuant to Court orders. As the Court orders were broad and the sealing
was  to  be  done  by  the  Municipal  Corporation  of  Delhi  (MCD),  supervised  by  the
Monitoring Committee, the question often arose of ascertaining whether in a specific case
of an establishment being sealed, it was violating the Master Plan or not. Also, getting
temporary relief  for  removal  of  supplies  already stocked up in  the  shops,  became a
repeated cause of affected parties approaching the Court. In such a situation, with the
number of applications proliferating in the same case, it became cluttered and extremely
difficult to manage. The amicus, who had a monopoly on deciding which applications
would be heard by the Court and when, occupied an increasingly powerful position.
35 This 1985 PIL writ petition number 4677/1985 was what I call an “omnibus PIL.” This
meant that the case had become a juggernaut which dealt with, for example, all aspects
relating to “misuse of properties” at a city-wide level, with the Master Plan being the
reference point in deciding the scale of the problem and its geography, and all other
individual cases filed pertaining to this issue would be deemed to be a part of the omnibus
case.  Since  there  were  obviously  a  very  large  number  of  properties  affected,  only  a
relatively small number of them could be sealed every day. The newspapers approvingly
reported this sealing process on a daily basis, with comments by the members of the
Monitoring Committee  as  they accompanied the  MCD sealing squad.  The monitoring
committee acquired a reputation for their zeal in removing the “illegalities” from the
city, and their activities were vociferously backed by the media and the Resident Welfare
Associations (RWAs)—organizations of middle-class residents of gated colonies that
proliferated in Delhi in the 2000s.
36 The massive outcry from the traders and shopkeepers that followed the sealing actions
under the orders of the Court also got public attention, but it was seen by the newspapers
and the Courts as colored by “political society” and its illegalities. And “political society”
did indeed intervene, this time speedily unlike at the time of the relocation of industries.
While the state had till now mostly allowed the Court to shape the city as per its wishes,
with  the  sealing  matter,  the  political  stakes  became too  high.  The  shopkeepers  and
traders of Delhi had always been a powerful constituency and both the leading parties
were quite agitated about sealing, unlike the slum demolitions issue.
37 On March 28, 2006, the day before sealing was to start, a notification was issued by the
Delhi Development Authority (DDA) modifying the Master Plan insofar as the chapter on
mixed use was concerned. The aim was to take a liberal view regarding mixed land use,
i.e. the provision of non-residential activity in residential premises (see Press Information
Bureau 2006).  The  attempt  was  to  give  relief  to  small  shopkeepers  affected  by  the
Supreme Court directive, allowing some commercial activities to run in residential areas.
The  new  policy  to  legalize  commercial  activities  on  the  ground  floor  of  residential
premises would be applicable on 118 roads in the capital.  This was however still  too
minuscule a relief—and two days after the sealing started; the traders went on a 48-hour
strike amid a flurry of political activity. On April 10, Delhi traders met the President of
India, APJ Abdul Kalam and sought his intervention, arguing that the business community
was neither a petitioner nor respondent in the PIL under which action was being taken
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against them. Initially, the government tried to get a six-month reprieve from the Court
to “complete the exercise of identifying mixed use roads and streets in residential areas
within six months in a systematic and organized manner as per provisions of the Delhi
Master Plan.” But this cut no ice with the Court and it criticized the government for its
“policy of appeasement.” The Bench of Chief Justice YK Sabharwal and Justice CK Thakker
observed on April 28: “Appeasement causes confusion. We extended the time [for sealing]
but meanwhile it [Centre] came out with a notification. By doing so what message you
[Centre] want to convey to the law abiding citizen... It is a deliberate failure because of
extraneous considerations at the cost of the citizen and the message is the law abiding
citizen suffers.” The apex Court also observed that it was because of the nexus between
government  officials,  law  enforcing  agencies  and  businessmen  that  there was
unauthorized commercial use of the residential areas (Singh 2006).
38 Amidst the Court’s intransigence and bipartisan political support, the government finally
introduced a new law in Parliament called the Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006.
This  proposed  a  one-year  moratorium  from  punitive  action  against  unauthorized
development  in  the  capital  and  provided  for  status  quo  as  of  January  1,  2006  on
unauthorized development in respect of mixed land use, construction beyond sanctioned
plans and encroachment by slum dwellers, hawkers and street vendors in the city. On
May 12, 2006, the Delhi Laws (Special Provision) Bill, 2006 was passed by the Lower House;
the Upper House passed it three days later, and on receipt of assent of the President on
May  19,  2006,  it  was  notified  the  same  day—an  unusually  fast  pace  for  a  Central
legislation. The very next day, the Government of India issued a Notification placing a
moratorium for a period of one year with respect to all notices issued by local authorities
regarding categories of  unauthorized development.  With the Act and this  notice,  the
government tried to relieve those who had given an undertaking to the Court, and also
issued directions for removal of seals that had been placed on the premises until then. As
a  result,  the  municipal  authorities  suspended  their  sealing  drive.  By  the  time  the
Notification  was  issued,  around  15,000  commercial  establishments  functioning  in
residential areas had already been sealed, out of which 6,000 were de-sealed after the
Court received affidavits from the owners.
39 The constitutionality of this new statute was challenged immediately and came up before
the  same  “sealing”  bench  of  the  Supreme  Court.  Initially,  the  Court  just  expressed
outrage in oral remarks calling this new law “wholly invalid and void,” and declared that
“this is pure and simple legislature over-ruling this Court.” The Court speculated that the
statute  might  be  unconstitutional,  but  refused  to  stay  its  operation  until  the
constitutionality question had been adjudicated. On August 10, 2006, however, while the
Court still made oral statements from the bench that “though prima facie the Act is an
‘invalid’ statute, we are not inclined to completely stay the legislation” (Singh), it insisted
on suspending the notification that had been passed a day after the Act was passed, as it
was seen as expressly trying to undo and overrule the actions that the Court had already
taken.
40 The premise was that even if the sealing of new areas covered under the moratorium was
now  barred,  the  government  could  not  undo  actions  with  respect  to  the  specific
establishments  against  which the Court  had already taken action,  either  in terms of
affidavits  filed  undertaking  to  stop  misuse  by  June 30  or  in  cases  of  establishments
already sealed. The Court therefore ordered the Municipal authorities to re-seal some
5,000  shops,  which  had  been  first  sealed  by  the  Court  and  then  unsealed  by  the
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government.  The  Court  also  ordered the  sealing  of  the  40,800  shops  that  had given
affidavits to stop commercial activities on their premises after September 15 (extended
from the earlier date of June 30).  Two categories had emerged—those who had given
affidavits and those who had not.
41 The government was at first wrong-footed and had to undo its earlier notification with a
fresh notice. But amidst the resumption of the sealing, after three months and a fresh
crisis, the Delhi Government finally amended the Master Plan in September, declaring
large areas—that  already had massive commercial  presence but  were still  designated
“residential”—“commercial.”  The  amended  Plan  also  declared  that  some  residential
colonies could have commercial establishments in their midst. Colonies, as residential
neighborhoods in Delhi are called, were categorized from A to G by size of residential
plots and density of population (both being indicators of “posh’ness,” an English word
that has successfully been adopted into Delhi Hindi). Except for “A” and “B” areas, where
zoning was to be strictly enforced, with minor exceptions allowed only if the local RWAs
agreed, the other categories were granted a reprieve. The government also issued two
notifications in September 2006,  clearing 2,183 roads for mixed land use,  commercial
stretches and pedestrian shopping streets in the C, D, E, F, G and H categories of colonies
across the capital. As the sealing continued, a “Bandh” against the sealing campaign called
by the Confederation of All India Traders on September 20, 2006 led to violence and five
people died by police weapons fire in Seelampur, one of the poorest parts of East Delhi
(Sethi 2006). These actions by the government as well as the protests were, of course,
immediately condemned by the media, the RWAs and the Court as unseemly vote-bank
politics.
42 With the conflict heating up, on September 29, 2006, the Court criticized the government
for these notifications, calling them “ad hoc measures” and orally observed that “the last
minute  notifications  are  causing  utter  confusion  and  chaos  to  the  citizens...  An
impression is given as if judiciary is on one side and government on the other side.” It
continued to insist that at least the 40,000-odd people who had already filed affidavits
undertaking to stop misuse would still have to comply with the Court’s order or have
their shops sealed to protect “the dignity and authority of the Court.” The Court allowed
them until October 31, 2006 on account of the festival of Diwali. With regard to those who
had  been  saved  by  the  new  September  notifications,  the  Court  required  fresh
undertakings to be filed by all before the Monitoring Committee by November 10, 2006
(later  extended to January 31,  2007)  that  misuse would be stopped as  per  the Court
directions if the law was invalidated and/or the notifications quashed. It also declared
that sealing would continue vis-à-vis others not covered by the notifications. The Court
restrained  the  government  from  issuing  any  other  notification  for  conversion  of
residential use into commercial use except with the leave of the Court.
43 With the October 31 deadline approaching and another bandh call given by the traders at
the perceived discrimination against the 40,000 traders who had given undertakings, the
MCD and the Government again approached the Court. This time they were armed with a
survey which said that 25,000 out of these 40,000 odd would be covered by the September
mixed-land use notifications. The Court finally recognized the anomaly in insisting on
action against the people who had filed affidavits in time, while others who had not filed
would get away, and temporarily barred action against them. But after the experience of
these shops who had filed affidavits, the others covered by the new notifications who
were also now required to file  fresh undertakings that  they would be subject  to the
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Court’s final decision on the legality of the notifications by January 31 2007, hesitated to
file any affidavits because they did not want to be in a similar boat in the future. As
sealing could now theoretically resume against all of them, the government deployed its
final  weapon  on  February  7,  2007.  It  notified  a  New  Master  Plan  for  Delhi,  which
incorporated the recent mixed-use notifications and relaxed many of the zoning norms.
44 The new plan—MPD 2021—was declared an “Anti-Plan plan” by the newspapers and was
immediately challenged as invalid in the Supreme Court by the RWAs. The Court again
reacted in a similarly to how it had to the other amendments and declared it  would
examine the constitutionality of the Plan. It also made actions taken as per the new Plan
norms subject to the Court’s final decision as to its constitutionality. For instance, for the
first  time,  the Plan allowed a third floor to be constructed in a  residential  building.
Initially the Court barred the MCD from giving any permission for the construction of a
third floor in residential  areas under this provision,  but a year later (by an order in
March,  2008),  the Court  allowed it,  subject  to an undertaking provided by the home
owners that they would abide by its final decision on the validity of MPD-2021. An MCD
official explained the standard practice that had evolved on this issue after this order:
“The Court had said neither the owner nor the person to whom the property would be
sold or transferred could claim equity, if the verdict goes against them. We just take an
affidavit from the owner stating this.” The MCD had already sanctioned almost 25,000
building plans for the third floor by 2011 (Chitalangia 2011). By 2013, this number was
estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands.
45 The writ petition challenging the 2007 Master Plan that arose in this case and was heard
along with it, is still pending in Court, and hundreds of thousands of people own and/or
live in third-floor residential units throughout the city. But permission to construct this
additional floor is given subject to the Court decision and if the Court decides against the
New Master Plan norms, these third-floor units would be declared illegal and subject to
demolition—a kind of Damocles’ sword hanging over people in Delhi due to this case.
Meanwhile,  the drama of  sealing and de-sealing continued off  and on even after the
MPD-2021 came into force, though with relatively fewer protagonists and lower stakes.
After 2009, in particular since the retirement of Justice Arijit Pasayat, who headed this
bench after Justice Sabharwal’s retirement, hardly any effective hearing took place in this
case (Sinha 2013).  It  had become impossibly unwieldy with hundreds of  IAs  pending,
mostly for the de-sealing of specific previously-sealed premises. For a bench hearing this
case for the first time, it was a herculean task to get a handle on the sheer bulk of the files
in this case. The cause list of this case alone, listing all the pending matters, would itself
run into the dozens of pages. By 2013, as many as 900 IAs connected to this case were still
pending. Also pending were the writ petitions challenging the constitutionality of the
provisions of the Master Plan 2021, the Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, which had
been renewed every year and the DDA notifications allowing mixed land use. The Court
had had enough of it by then, and on April 30, 2013, the sealing case was divided into two
parts  and  remanded  to  the  lower  judiciary.  The  IAs  dealing  with  factual  questions
requesting de-sealing were sent to the appellate tribunals of the respective Municipal
Authorities in Delhi, and the writ petitions dealing with the more legal questions were
referred to the Delhi High Court. The Court had belatedly realized its own limitations in
dealing with issues of such complexity and amplitude. Meanwhile, the Delhi Laws (Special
Provisions) continues to be extended periodically and was still in force in 2015.
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Conclusion
46 One of the reasons for the Court easing off on sealing was the retirement in January 2007
of  Chief  Justice  YK  Sabharwal,  who  had  presided  over  the  sealing  matter  from  the
beginning. In fact, he had initiated this matter by his order in 2005 and moved the focus
decisively from relocation of  “non-conforming industries” to commercial  “misuse” of
residential  properties.  On his  retirement  he confessed that  the “sealing case” in the
Capital was the most difficult one of his career. He said that he earned the wrath of his
friends and relatives on the issue: “My friends and relatives even stopped talking to me.
Yesterday one of my relatives [affected by the sealing order] told me sarcastically that I
am a big man. I told him I cannot solve individual problems. The problem is because of
corruption in the system and flaws in the Master Plan” (The Hindu 2007). Perhaps the
uniqueness of  the sealing case in Delhi’s  long history of  PIL is  not only the amazing
alacrity and avidity with which the Government and MCD fought the long-drawn out
chess battle with the Court, with one move following another, but also that the potential
losers in this case could include the “friends and relatives” of a Supreme Court judge, not
something  that  could  be  said  of  the  thousands  made  jobless  by  the  relocation  of
industries in the same case or indeed, of the slum-dwellers who were made homeless by
the PIL Courts’ intervention in the 2000s.
47 As Justice Sabharwal phrased his dilemma: “The issue of sealing was difficult, as on the
one hand it was a question of law and on the other it was the sufferings of people.” For
once, at least, the judge was in a position to encounter (and potentially understand) the
“sufferings of people” caused by his PIL orders, unlike in the many other instances of
people  who lost  their  livelihoods  because  of  the  orders  in  this  very  case.  The auto-
rickshaw drivers were easy sacrificial lambs for the cause of the environment—unlike,
say, diesel car manufacturers. Owners of large factories wanting to close sunset industries
and convert them into profitable real estate were given a break by the Court, while the
labor working in the same factories paid a heavy price. Smaller factory owners had less
space to maneuver in Court but a section of them managed to pull their political weight
eventually. But the hundreds of thousands of traders and “mom-and-pop shop” owners of
Delhi  were  an  immeasurably  more  powerful  constituency,  for  political  society  and
eventually, even for the Court.
48 Perhaps this is why the sealing matter had a much stormier career in Court—lasting for a
whole year, and allowing the Court at best a pyrrhic victory. It is not a story we encounter
very often with PIL, but the exception is of interest precisely for that reason. When can
people maneuver around an all-powerful PIL Court, and when can they not?
49 The most unsavory aspect of the sealing case came to light four months after Justice
Sabharwal’s retirement—causing what writer Arundhati Roy then called a “scandal in the
palace” (Roy 2007). In May 2007 the tabloid Midday published a news item pointing out
that just when Justice Sabharwal was kickstarting the “sealing case” by turning the long-
running  PIL  about  relocation  of  industries  into  a  case  about  misuse  of  commercial
properties, his sons were entering into partnership with two major mall and commercial
complex developers, resulting at the very least in a “conflict of interest” as their father
led a judicial campaign that indirectly benefited them. Suddenly, the repressed aspect of
the sealing case was out  in the open:  it  was about  mall  owners  versus  shopkeepers.
Closing down shops would create a demand for mall space. The sealing campaign had
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further limited the availability of commercial space for shops, and as Roy put it, “The
better-off amongst those whose shops and offices had been sealed queued up for space in
these malls. Prices shot up. The mall business boomed, it was the newest game in town.”
And ironically, the judge who initiated and presided over the sealing campaign against
commercial use of residential property, himself simultaneously allowed his sons to use
his private as well as official residence for commercial purposes, that too as their firm’s
registered office! Meanwhile, instead of starting any inquiry against Justice Sabharwal,
the whistleblower journalists of Midday were sentenced to four months’ imprisonment for
contempt of Court,  in a hurriedly decided suo motu case 24 initiated by the Delhi High
Court.
50 Even if  the charges of  corruption against Justice Sabharwal are unproven and it  was
perhaps “a borderline case” (Tehelka 2007), the remarkable fact is that a jurisdiction like
PIL enabled a judge to wilfully initiate a roving inquiry into a complex issue like zoning
that  affected  millions.  He  could  then  decide  on  the  path  to  be  taken  and  force  its
implementation at a citywide level with supervision by his own chosen officials, with his
own  handpicked lawyer  deciding  the  direction  of  the  case  and  without  necessarily
hearing the parties affected by his decisions. In such a system, petty corruption is at the
very least  an occupational  hazard.  Ideological  predilection leading a  judge in such a
direction is scarcely less dangerous.
51 Such  an  ideological  slant  in  favor  of  corporate  capital  was  clearly  enunciated  in  a
judgment made by the Supreme Court around the same time that it  was leading the
campaign against the toleration of illegalities in “the sealing case.” On October 17, 2006,
the Court delivered its verdict on one of the most conspicuous cases of elite illegality in
Delhi.  The cause of the controversy was the construction of a huge complex of three
“world-class” shopping malls, intended to be the most exclusive in India. The location of
these malls was to be the South Delhi ridge, hitherto designated a forest area, and with a
history of acute water scarcity in the residential neighborhoods in the vicinity. A PIL had
been  filed  against  the  malls  by  concerned  citizens  of  the  area.  No  environmental
clearance  had  been  obtained.  An  “expert  committee”  appointed  by  the  Court  found
blatant illegalities and noted that “the location of large commercial complexes in this
area  was  environmentally  unsound.”  But  with  substantial  construction  already
completed, the committee recommended “a compromise with de facto situation.” The
environmentalist petitioners protested against such post-facto regularization, and cited
various  decisions  of  the  Court  where  it  had  “taken  serious  view  of  unauthorized
construction.”
52 The Court brushed aside all objections, having decided already that it was “satisfied about
the bona fides” of the mall developers. What the bench did here was to clearly specify its
double  standards:  “The  stand  that  wherever  constructions  have  been  made
unauthorizedly demolition is the only option cannot apply to the present cases, more
particularly, when they unlike (sic), where some private individuals or private limited
companies or firms being allotted to have made contraventions, are corporate bodies and
institutions and the question of their having indulged in any malpractices in getting the approval
or sanction does not arise.” (Emphases mine).
53 Just  18  days  before  the  above  verdict,  the  Supreme Court  had  passed  the  following
judgment in 4677/1985 at the height of its exasperation in the sealing case:
The city of Delhi is an example of a classical case, which, for the last number of
years, has been a witness of flagrant violations of municipal laws, town planning
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laws and norms, Master Plan and environmental laws. It is borne out from various
orders and judgments passed by this Court and the Delhi High Court, whether in a
case  of  shifting  of  hazardous  and polluting  industries  or providing cleaner  fuel
(CNG)  or  encroachment  of  public  land  and  streets  or  massive  unauthorized
construction and misuse of properties. It is a common knowledge that these illegal
activities are also one of the main sources of corruption.
Through PIL, the appellate judges of Delhi launched a fierce drive to undo illegality and
corruption in the municipal regulation of land use of Delhi, of which WP 4677/1985 is the
definitive  example.  However,  some of  the  most  flagrant  of  such violations  were  the
massive building complexes built clearly in violation of municipal norms—Akshardham
Temple and Commonwealth Games Village on the Yamuna River Bed, Sainik Farms—the
largest unauthorized colony in Delhi and of course, the Vasant Kunj malls. High profile
PILs had been filed against all of these conspicuously illegal developments and these were
all  heard in the same decade that  saw so much judicial  action against  illegally  built
structures all over the city. However, in each of these cases of egregious violations of
municipal laws, the Court rationalized their existence and refrained from intervening. All
of these buildings survive unscathed. The wrath of PIL was clearly a selective one.
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1. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13381/1984
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3. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13029/1985
4. For  an  extended  discussion  of  the  ideological  roots  of  this  new informalism of  the  post-
emergency period, see Bhuwania (2014).
5. The members of this committee were DK Biswas, Chairman of the Central Pollution Control
Board, Anil Aggarwal of the Centre for Science and Environment, Shri Jagdish Khattar of Maruti
Udyog Limited, and Ms. Kiran Dhingra, Transport Commissioner of Delhi.
6. See the Supreme Court judgment at http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/28%
20July%201998.pdf
7. On March 26, 2001, the Supreme Court extended this deadline to September 30, 2001, provided
auto-rickshaw-owners “who have placed firm orders for new CNG vehicles or for conversion to
CNG mode” “give details on affidavits by 31st March, 2001 about their existing vehicles, as also
details of the orders placed by them for new CNG vehicles or for conversion to CNG mode.” The
difficulties in this process of getting an official document to prove that such an order has been
placed is  discussed in  Faruqui  and Raghav Sud (N.d.).  This  caused a  situation where  tens  of
thousands of auto-rickshaw-owners had to file the requisite affidavits in the Supreme Court in
five days’ time, leading to an unprecedented situation in the Supreme Court registry. As a result
of this melee and the confusion caused by the conversion process, the number of auto-rickshaw
permits in Delhi declined from 83,000 to 50,000 in 2002.
8. Paragraph 9 of the Order of 16.12.1997.
9. Order dated September 3,  2009. The EPCA accordingly submitted its Report Number 34 on
“Review of  Existing  Cap  on  the  Number  of  Three-wheelers  in  Delhi  and its  Implications  for
Pollution and Congestion” in January 2010. The Court finally granted permission for an increase
on November 18, 2011.
10. The application on behalf of the auto-rickshaw unions was first moved in this case to the
Supreme Court in 2009.
11. In 2011, an estimated 90% of TSRs were owned by financiers as opposed to drivers, according
to the Special Leave Petition (Civil) 22870-22871 of 2011 in Nyaya Bhoomi v. Transport Department
(2011).On the other hand, in 2001, an estimated 65 percent were driven by their owners. See
Mohan and Roy (2003).
12. See Mehta (2007). For older versions of this theory of Modus Vivendi, see Rudolph and Rudolph
(1981). The classic account remains Baxi (1980).
13. WP(C)202/1995.  For a discussion of the role of the amicus curiae in “the forest case,” see
Chowdhury (2014:177). Chowdhury provides instances to “illustrate how the amicus curiae in this
case was able to repeatedly influence the Court’s thinking” (2014:185).
14. For a discussion of the writ petition filed in this case, see Sharan (2014:200)
15. The  most  important  of  the  many  applications  filed  in  this  case  turned  out  to  be  IA
No. 22/1995, under which the orders in the next three phases of this case would nominally be
passed.
16. AIR 1996 SC 2231.
17. For the higher figure and contextualizing discussion, see Nigam (2001).
18. For an uncannily similar move to exclude affected groups from being heard in “the forest
case,” see Bhuwania (2014:332).
19. (1996) 4 SCC 750
20. While the July 1996 order about the 168 industries was about those falling under the highly
polluting “H” category, (which needed to be relocated out of Delhi in a neighbouring district),
industries belonging to Categories B,  C,  D,  E,  F and G, located in “non-conforming” areas,  as
classified by the Master Plan, were to be moved to designated industrial areas. See Gill (2009:225).
21. I remember being forced to walk to my workplace at the time, a distance of more than ten
kilometers, witnessing the scenes of complete breakdown, the like of which I have never seen
before or after in my long stay in Delhi.
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22. For an insightful account of the mobilization of “traders” against the sealing case, see Mehra
(2012).
23. This had become standard practice in PILs by then. See Bhuwania (2014:331–33).
24. Or, as it is usually called in India, “Court on its own motion.”
ABSTRACTS
In the last three decades, Delhi, just like many other cities globally, has seen massive changes in
its political economy, with a move from industry to services. What marks Delhi’s dislocations as
distinct  however  is  their  source  and  their  basis—they  are  based  not  on  administrative  or
municipal policy or executive directions, but on judicial directions in cases of Public Interest
Litigation (PIL) concerning pollution in the city. The spectacular efficacy of PIL in carrying out
such a role, I will argue in this paper, can be explained not only by the external ideological trends
prevailing during this time period, but also by the peculiar nature of PIL itself as a fundamentally
unstable and endlessly malleable jurisdiction.
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